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EI.JLA E. HARROLD, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ELLS· 
WORTH HARROLD, Defendant and Appellant. 
[1J Husband and Wife - Oommunity and Separate Property-
Profits of Husband's Business.- Where husband is operating 
a business which is his separate propel'ty, income from such 
business is allocated to community or separate property in 
accordance with extent to which it is allocable to husband's 
efforts or his capital investment. 
[2J Id.-Determination of Character of Property-Appeal.-Where 
there is substantial evidence to sustain trial court's finding 
that a designated sum representing husband's earnings from 
business operated by him was community property, such ftnd-
ing will not be disturbed on appeal. 
[3] Id.-Management and Control of Property.-When a divorce 
is pending, power of husband over community property exists 
" until entry of final decree. 
[4J hterest-Time From Which hterest Buns.-Wife who ob-
tained divorce on ground of extreme cruelty is not entitled to 
interest on her share of community property during time 
husband had management and control of such property prior 
to entry of final deeree, since during that period he was not 
using wife's property within meaning of Civ. Code, § 1915, 
defining interest as eompensation for use, forbearance or de-
tention of money. 
[6J Divorce - Disposition of Community Property - Extreme 
Cruelty.-Although Civ. Code, § 146, subd. 1, impliedly re-
quires that more than one-half of community property be 
awarded to spouse obtaining divorce on ground of extreme 
cruelty, the proportion to be awarded depends on eircum-
stances of each case, and it cannot be said that an award of 
51.13 per cent to wife obtaining divorce was improper as a 
matter of law where no abuse of discretion is shown. 
[8] Id.-Judgment-Final Judgment-Time for Entry.-Civ. Code, 
§ 132, prohibiting entry of final divorce decree if any appeal is 
taken and pending from interlocutory decree, is applicable 
whether appeal is a limited one or an appeal from entire 
judgment. 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Community Property, § 22; Am.Jur., Com-
munity Property, § 33. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Husband and Wife, § 58; [2] Hus-
band and Wife, § 94; [3] Husband and Wife, § 101; [4] Interest, 
118(2); [5, 8} Divorce, § 234(2); [6, 7] Divorce, § 121(1). 
) 
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[71 Id.-Judgment-Final Judgmcnt--Time for Entry. ":nlry of 
finn.\ divorce decr!'!', following pll rt!n.l reversn.l of interlocutory 
decree on appeal, on same day as judgment on retrial of 
designated financial i~sues was proper, where more than a year 
had elapsed since entry of interlocutory decree, where portion 
of decree granting divorce was affirmed, and where no sufficient 
reason was shown why there should be delay in entry of final 
decree beyond express prohibitions of Civ. Code, § 132. 
[8] ld.-Disposition of Community Property-Extreme Cruelty.-
When a divorce is granted on ground of extreme cruelty, trial 
court has wide discretion in allowance of expenses and costs 
as well as in division of community property within established 
rules, and such allowance will not be disturbed in absence 
of a showing of abuse of discretion. 
APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sacra-
mento County. Malcolm C. Glenn, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action for divorce. Judgment for plaintiff with respect to 
di~-ision of community property, affirmed. 
David Livingston and Louis F. DiResta for Plaintiff and 
.A ppellant. 
Devlin, Diepenbrock & Wulff and A. I. Diepenbrock for 
Defendant and Appellant. 
SHENK, J.-In this action for divorce a decree was entered 
of date November 1, 1951, purporting to conform to the 
direction of the District Court of Appeal on a former appeal 
by the plaintiff from certain financial provisions of the inter-
locutory decree. 
Plaintiff and defendant were married on November 26. 
1936. They separated for the first time in the fall of 1944. 
In June, 1945, they entered into a separation agreement which 
purported to settle all present and future property rights 
arising out of the marital relationship. In September, 1945. 
they became reconciled but in March, 1948. again separated. 
'rhereafter the plaintiff commenced the present action for 
divorce, charging extreme cruelty. The interlocutory decre£' 
was entered on February 15, 1949. By that decree the trial 
court found and concluded that by reason of their recon-
ciliation, the parties had abandoned the executory provisions 
of the separation agreement. It made an award of $400 a 
month for five years for the support and maintenance of the 
plaintiff. It divided the community property equally between 
June 1954] llAluWI.D v. I1ARRor,D 
143 C.2d 77: 271 P.2d 4891 
7!J 
the parties. The plaintiff appealed from the financial pro-
visions of the judgment and only from that portion thereof 
denying- her the full relief demanded. The defendant did not 
appeal. The District Court of Appeal held that in an action 
for divorce on the ground of extreme cruelty the nonoffending 
party is entitled to· more than one-half of the community 
property, citing Tipton v. Tipton, 209 Cal. 443 [288 P. 65], 
and that the trial court should have considered the earnings 
of the defendant accruing prior to the entry of the final decree 
in determining the community estate. (Harrold v. Harrold, 
100 Cal.App.2d 601 [224 P.2d 66J.) The pertinent portions 
of the judgment of the District Court of Appeal are on page 
609 and are as follows: ". . . the interlocutory judgment is 
affirmed, except . • • as to that portion relating to a division 
of the community lestate, which is remanded to the trial court 
with instructions to determine the division of the amount of 
the community estate as indicated herein. . • ." 
Before retrial the parties stipulated that the accounting 
should cover a period from July 31, 1948, to three months 
prior to the date of the final decree. From findings made 
following the retrial the court concluded and ordered that 
the final degree be entered on November 1, 1951, and that the 
accounting period should terminate on August 1, 1951. It 
found that during this period the sum of $89,904 accrued to 
~he community; that $88,224 remained in the community 
estate, and ordered that the defendant pay to the plaintiff 
$45,112 as her share. By this division she was awarded 
51.13 per cent of the total estate in full settlement of her 
community property interest. 
The plaintiff's appeal is from that part of the judgment 
"which specified that the plaintiff shall have and receive 
from the defendant the sum of $45,112.00." She makes ten 
contentions. Six relate to the court's determination of the 
amount allocable to community earnings out of the defend-
ant's total income. These contentions will be disposed of 
before consideration of the others. 
The community estate is made up of the defendant's earn-
ings from two automobile enterprises which were the de-
fendant's separate property. Other income from these busi-
nesses was determined to be a return on the investment of his 
separate capital. Numerous exhibits consisting of the de-
fendant's books, records and income tax returns were intro-
duced in evidence, and it is apparent that the court's findings 
were based to a large extent upon these exhibits. The plain-
') 
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ti1fs seeks to show that the defendant's earnings as contrasted 
with the return from his investment in these businesses were 
far greater than found by the court.' 
[1] The rule of law applicable to the allocation to the 
community estate under these circumstances is stated in 
Huber v. Huber, 27 Ca1.2d 784. at page 792 [167 P.2d 7081 
as follows: "In regard to earnings, the rule is that where the 
husband is operating a business which is bis separate prop-
erty, income from such business is allocated to community or 
separate property in accordance with the extent to which it 
is allocable to the busband's efforts or bis capital investment. 
(Estate of Gold, 170 Cal. 621 [151 P. 12]; Witaschek v. 
Witaschek, 56 Cal.App.2d 277 [132 P.2d 600]; 3 Cal.Jur. 
10-Yr.Supp., Community Property, § 46.)" 
During the accounting period the defendant received from 
one of his enterprises, the Northern Motor Company, a salary 
of $1,000 per month for a period of nine months, after which 
the company ceased doing business and was dissolved. The 
defendant received from his other business, the Ellsworth 
Harrold Company, a salary of $2,000 a month until June 15, 
1950, and thereafter until the end of the accounting period 
$2,200 a month. In addition be received a bonus of $11,374 
for 1950 and $1.430 for attendance at various corporate di-
rectors' meetings. These earnings totaled $89,904, all of 
which the court found to be community property. 
The profits of the Ellsworth Harrold Company varied from 
approximately $100.000 to $135,000 during the accounting 
period. It produced practically all of the defendant's income I 
other than his community earnings. There is substantial 
evidence to the effect that the company owes its prosperity in 
a large part to a Ford dealer's franchise; that this business 
is staffed with competent administrative personnel; that the 
defendant does not take an active part in its routine opera-
tions; that he frequently absents himself on personal matters, 
and that he is primarily concerned with policy matters in the 
operation of the business. The defendant is virtually the 
sole owner of the company, and is in a position where he can 
allocate a greater salary to himself if he chooses to do so. 
The plaintiff contends that "the court cannot accept as con-
clusive the arbitrary determination by Harrold as to the 
amount of his salary." She urges the consideration of evi-
dence at variance with that above indicated. [a] But it is 
sufficient if the trial court has duly considered the divergent 
factual situations and has been impressed by the evidence 
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more favorable to the defendant. This evidence is substantial 
and the finding based thereon that $89,904 is allocable to per-
sonal earnings by virtue of the defendant's efforts should not 
be disturbed on appeal. (Estate of Bristol, 23 Ca1.2d 221 
[143 P.2d 689] ; Crawford v. Southern Pac. Co., 3 Ca1.2d 427 
[45 P.2d 183].) 
On the prior appeal the District Court of Appeal held 
that the defendant's salaries fairly represented his contribu-
tion to income of his businesses. It stated at pages 607 and 
608: "\V e are convinced from our examination of the record 
that the trial court conscientiously endeavored to follow the 
rule as enunciated in the Huber case and to make an equitable 
allocation of personal income and community earnings as was I 
warranted under the particular facts and circumstances dis-
closed in the present case." The quoted language served as a 
guide t~ the trial court in the present proceedings. The 
allocation to average annual community earnings, including 
bonuses, during the preseut accounting period is greater than 
in the prior proceedings, although the overall average income 
of the defendant's businesses had decreased. In these circum-
stances, the above quoted language is equally applicable to this 
appeal. 
The plaintiff's seventh contention is that she is entitled to 
interest on her share of the community property accumulating 
during the accounting period. By this contention she does 
not seek to recover her share of interest earned from an in-
vestment of community property. (See Civ. Code, §§ 164. 
687.) It does not appear that the community funds here in-
volved were invested or earned any interest or increment. 
The recovery sought is based upon the defendant's control and 
use of the plaintiff's" present, existing and equal" interest in 
the community property as it is accumulated. (See Civ. 
Code, § 16la.) While the defendant had the community funds 
in his possession he did so by virtue of the power given him 
to manage and control such property for the benefit of the 
community. (Civ. Code, §§ 161a. 172 and 172a.) [3] When 
a divorce is pending the power of a husband over the com-
munity property exists until the entry of a final decree. 
(Lord v. Hough, 43 Cal. 581; Chance v. Kobsted, 66 Cal.App. 
434, 437 [226 P. 632] ; In re Cummings, 84 F.Supp. 65, 69.) 
[4] Interest is defined in section 1915 of the Civil Code as 
"the compensation allowed by law or fixed by the parties for 
the use, or forbearance, or detention of money." It is ap-
parent that the defendant was not using the money of the 
) 
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plaintiff within the meaning of that section and she is not en-
titled to interest thereon. 
The plaintiff's eighth contention is that since she was 
awarded the divorce on grounds of extreme cruelty she should 
be awarded substantially more than one-half of the community 
property under the mandate of the decision in the prior 
appeal. Civil Code, section 146, provides in part: " .•• One. 
If the decree is rendered on the ground of adultery, incurable 
insanity or extreme cruelty, the community property shall 
be assigned to the respective parties in such proportions as 
the court, from all the facts of the case, and the condition 
of the parties may deem just." In all other cases the com-
munity property must be divided equally between the parties. 
(Civ. Code, supra, § 146, subd. Two.) It is stated in the 
opinion of the court on the prior appeal, at page 608: C C The 
inference derived from this code section is that the nonoffend-
ing party is entitled to more than one-half of the community 
property wh~re the divorce is granted on the ground of ex-
treme cruelty. (Tipton V. Tipton, 209 Cal. 443 [288 P. 
65] .... )" In support of her argument that she properly 
should be awarded "substantially" more than one-half of the 
community property, the plaintiff relies on a statement in 
QuageZli V. Quagelli (1929), 99 Cal.App. 172, at page 176 
[277 P. 1089] : " ... in all cases the uniform rule has been 
that where the decree is on the ground of extreme cruelty the 
award to the unoffending spouse must be substantially greater 
than that to the one who is at fault." The plaintiff asserts 
that the 51.13 per cent awarded her is not "substantially 
greater" than the 48.87 per cent retained by the defendant. 
In Gorman v. Gorman, 134 Cal. 378 [66 P. 313], it was held 
that though section 146 impliedly requires that more than 
half of the community property be awarded to the innocent 
party, it does not otherwise limit the discretion of the trial 
court in making the award; that the portion should depend 
upon the particular circumstances of each case, and that this 
court would be slow to interfere with an exercise of legal dis-
cretion by the trial court. (See also Orouch v. Orouch (1944), 
63 (!al.App.2d 747, 756 [147 P.2d 678].) The Quagelli case, 
supra, upon which the plaintiff relies, recognizes the fore-
going principle in the following language at page 176: "What 
the difference should be depends upon the circumstances of 
each case, aud that is a matter to be determined by the trial 
court in t.he first instance. . .. " [5] It cannot be Raid as 
a matter of law that the award to the plaintiff in the present 
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case is not ill I'Ollll'liall('I' wilh slatillory pl'o\·isi<Olls. 1111" Ihal 
an examinat ion of thc r<~eof(1 revpals an ah1\sP of d isprl'l ion 
in apportiollin~ the community estaie. 
The plaintiff's final contentions are that under the mandate 
on the prior appeal the trial court erred in not entering a new 
interlocutory decree. and in entering the final decree on 
November 1. 1951. More than two years and ten months 
elapsed between the interlocutory decree and the entry of 
the final decree by the trial court. Section 132 of the Civil 
Code states in part: "When one year has expired after the 
entry of such interlocutory judgment, the court on motion of 
either party, or upon its own motion, may enter the final 
judgment granting the divorce .. " but if any appeal is 
taken from the interlocutory judgment or motion for a new 
trial made, final judgment shall not be entered until such 
moti~n or appeal has been finally disposed of, nor then, if 
the motion has been granted or judgment reversed." 
[6] It appears that the provisions of section 132 are as 
applicable whether the appeal is a limited one or an appeal 
from the whole of the judgment. In Webster v. Webster, 216 
Cal. 485 [14 P.2d 522], the plaintiff appealed only from that 
portion of the interlocutory decree determining the property 
rights of the parties. While the appeal was pending a "final 
decree" of divorce was entered by the trial court. The court 
held the entry to be improper and stated at page 494: "Sec-
tion 132 of the Civil Code prohibits the entry of a final decree 
of divorce 'if any appeal is taken [and pending] from the 
interlocutory judgment.' This section has been held to pre-
clude the entry of a final decree though the appeal be only 
from that portion of the interlocutory decree determining the 
property rights of the parties." (See also Cory v. Cory, 71 
Cal.App.2d 309 [162 P.2d 497]; Ritter v. Ritter, 103 Cal. 
App. 583 [284 P. 950]; Newell v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. 
App. 343 [149 P. 998].) 
" Section 132, as interpreted by the Webster and other cases, 
provides that the final decree cannot be entered at certain 
designated times but it does not specify when it may be 
entered following a reversal on appeal. Here it was entered 
on the same day as the judgment on retrial of the designated 
1inancial issues. Neither section 132 nor the cases construing 
it expressly prohibit the entry at that time. The question 
• whether the Legislature intended by implication or other-
.,,n&e to delay the entry of the final judgment beyond such a f' when it eoaetI!<I the sectioa. The determination of this 
) 
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quest.ioll r('qllir('~ nil ill\'('stigal illn into thl' purpose a.nd reasoll 
for proviciillg /I. p ... rind /If dl'lay h('IWI'I'Il t.hp rnt.ry flf th" 
initial and thE' filial de('r!'!'" in r1ivorce. actions in this state. 
The entry of an interlocutory decree prior to tht' ent.ry of 
a tinal decree of divorce was tirst provided for in 1903 (Stats. 
1903, pp. 75. 76) by adding sections 131 and 132 to the Civil 
Code. Two years later, in Gratnrns v. Superior Court. 146 
Cal. 245 [79 P. 891. 106 Am.St.Rep. 23], this court at some 
length assigned reasons for the addition of the new sections. 
(See also Pereira v. Pereira, 156 Cal. 1 [103 P. 488, 134 
Am.St.Rep.l07, 23 L.R.A.N.S. 880J ; Deyoe v. Superior Court, 
140 Cal. 476 [74 P. 28, 98 Am.St.Rep. 73].) It appears from 
those early cases that the purpose of the 1903 legislation was 
based upon a policy of the state which does not favor a hasty 
dissolution of the bonds of matrimony. not from the stand-
point of property considerations affected by the marriage, 
but from the standpoint of past and future personal rela-
tionships. In later cases the following language appears: 
" 'The provision contained in section 132 of the Civil Code. 
. . . was adopted in recognition of the fact that in granting' 
a divorce the court bas a variety of duties to perform affecting 
the property rights of the parties and the future welfare of 
those parties and their children; and it was deemed advisable 
that in such cases all of those matters, as far as possible, should 
be finally adjusted in connection with the granting of a di-
vorce.'" (Webster v. Webster, supra, 216 Cal. 485, 494, quot- , 
ing from Newell v. Superior Court, 27 Cal.App. 343. 345 [149 
P.998].) 
It is to be noted that in both the Webster and the Newell 
cases a final decree was entered during the pendency of an 
appeal from an interlocutory judgment, and the entry of a 
final judgment at that time was prohibited by the clear lan-
guage of section 132. Weare not concerned in the present 
case with an appeal from the interlocutory decree as such. 
That decree. insofar as it ordered the dissolution of the bonds 
of matrim(>DY, was affirmed and became the law of the case. 
Any question in connection therewith was and is no longer 
open. including the right to the final decree as affected by 
property matters. Such matters. involving items of the ad-
ditional accounting period and the pro rata division of thE' 
community property, were adjudicated on the sub!lequent 
hearing as directed by the District Court of Appeal. Thill 
appeal from that adjmlication does not in any proper !lense 
constitute an appeal as contemplated by the Legislature in 
) 
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enacting section 132 such as would stay the entry of t he final 
decree. since Ilone of the stated purposes of such a stay are 
here applicable. (See lV ebstcr \'. lV ebster, supra, 216 Cal. 
485, 494; Pereira v. Pereira. supra, 156 Cal. 1. 9; Grannis 
v. Superior Oourt, supra, 146 Cal. 245. 248.) 
[7] From the foregoing it is apparent that there is no 
sufficient reason why the trial court should delay the entry 
of the final decree beyond the express prohibitions of section 
132. Furthermore there appear:> to be good reason for its 
entry at the time of judgment in the accounting determina· 
tion. If, as the plaintifl seeks to accomplish. the prohibitions 
of section 132 are applied to the present appeal in the same 
manner as to the interlocutory decree heretofore affirmed, the 
final decree could not be entered until any appeal taken here-
from had been determined or the time for appeal had ex-
pired. (i)n this theory an appeal would extend the period 
during which the defendant's earnings might accumulate to 
the community and, even though the judgment be affirmed, 
would necessitate another accounting by the trial court of 
the community estate accumulating since the close of the 
previous accounting period and during the time the appeal 
was pending. By appealing again and again from such judg-
ments the plaintiff might extend her marital status indefinitely 
for the purpose of sharing in the earnings of the defendant. 
In the present case there have been two appeals and more 
than five years have elapsed sint'e the entry of the inter-
locutory decree. There is nothing in section 132 of the Civil 
Code, nor in the cases dealing with the problem, which in-
dicates that under the circumstances here presented a new 
interlocutory decree should be entered. 
4 Our attention has been directed to the decision in DeVall 
!v. DeVall, 102 Cal.App.2d 53 [226 P.2d 605]. The judgment 
there granted an interlocutory decree of divorce and there-
after a new trial was ordered on the defendant's motion. 
;~ The second trial was limited to the consideration of a question 
~involving the division of community property. At the termi-
i, nation thereof the court signed an order to the effect that the 
previous interlocutory decree remain in effect. On the same 
day the court, on its own motion. granted the final decree of 
. divorce, more than a year having elapsed since the entry of 
the original interlocutory necree. On appeal it was held that 
the entry of the final decree before the expiration of the time 
,for appeal from the second judgment was improper. The 
~ ~ential factual difference in the present case is that here 
) 
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there has been all affirmance of the interlocutory decree sever-
ing the marital relationship, whereas in the DeVall case 
there was an interlocutory decree still appealable at the 
time the final decree was entered. 
The defendant's sole contention on his appeal is that he had 
legitimate and substantial expenses which should have been 
deducted from the total community estate before a division 
was made. These expenses include alimony, court costs and 
counsel fees awarded to the plaintiff, and all sorts of personal 
expenses. The trial court found that the defendant was not 
entitled to an offset for personal expenses since no such allow-
ance was made to the plaintiff, and that there would be no 
difference in the final result if there had been a monthly 
division of the communit.y income to offset current expenses 
or a single division of total community income during the 
accounting period. [8] When a divorce is granted on the 
ground of extreme cruelty the trial court has a wide discre-
tion in the allowance of expenses and costs as well as in the 
division of community property within established rules. It 
cannot be said on the record here presented that this discretion 
has been abused. 
The jUdgment is affirmed. 
Carter, J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
TRAYNOR, J.-I concur. 
I agree with the holding in the majority opinion that the 
trial court properly entered a final decree I)f divorce, but 
am of thc opinion that in reaching this result Wd should over-
rule Webster v. Webster, 216 Cal. 485, 487 [14 P.2d 522]. 
In the Webster case, as in the present one, the appeal was 
only from the part of the interlocutory decree dividing the 
community property. The majority opinion distinguishes 
the Webster case on the ground that there the final decree of 
divorce was entered during the pendency of an appeal from 
the interlocutory decree, whereas in the present case the final 
decree was entered after a judgment on retrial following an 
order of the District Court of Appeal stating that "the inter-
locutory judgment is affirmed, except ... as to that portion 
relating to a division of the community estate .... " (Harrold 
v. Harrold, 101 CaLApp.2d 601, 609 r224 P.2d 66].) Tllf' 
majorit.y opinion stateR that this order affirmed the part of 
the interlocutory decree diRsolving the marriage and holds 
that an appeal from the order entered after the retrial of 
) 
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tlil:' prop"!'! y i~~\1(,S i~ lint. ~lIdl all appl'al a~ will HI tty tile entry 
of a ilnal decrce ullder SI'ef,ioll la2 of t.he Civil Code. 
Since plaintiff's first appeal was from only that part of the 
interlocutory decree dividing the community property, the 
part of that decree dissolving the marriage was not before 
the District Court of Appeal for review. (American Enter-
prise, Inc. v. Van Winkle, 39 Ca1.2d 210, 216 [246 P.2d 935J : 
G. Ganahl Lbr. Co. v. Weinsveig, 168 Cal. 664, 667 [143 P. 
1025] ; Whalen v. Smith, 163 Cal. 360, 362 [125 P. 904, Ann. 
Cas. 1913E 1319].) It could not, therefore, affirm that part 
of the interlocutory decree, and its order reversed the only 
part of that decree that was before it for review. (Ibid.; 
Denman v. Smith, 14 Ca1.2d 752, 755 [97 P.2d 451].) Follow-
ing that reversal and a retrial of the issues, the trial court 
ordered a division of the community property. The present 
appeal is again from only that part of the judgment dividing 
the community property. The situation is the same as if the 
part of the interlocutory decree dividing the community 
property were appealed from for the first time. The fact 
that there was a prior appeal, a reversal, and a partial nf;W 
trial cannot avoid the prohibitory effect of section 132, if 
that section was properly construed in the Webster case. ' 
Even if there were several appeals and parts of the inter. 
loeutory decree were actually affirmed, the word "any" in 
seetion 132, as interpreted in the Webster case, would prohibit 
the entry of a final decree of divorce, for under that case 
the final decree cannot be entered if an appeal from any part 
of the interlocutory decree is pending. 
The majority opinion distinguishes DeVall v. DeVall, 102 
Cal.App.2d 53 [226 P.2d 605], from the present case on the 
same ground it distinguishes the Webster case by saying that 
in the DeVall case there was an interlocutory decree still 
appealable at the time the final decree was entered, whereas 
in the present case the part of the interlocutory decree dis-
solving the marriage had been affirmed on the prior appeal. 
In the DeVall case a new trial on the issues relating to the 
division of the community property was granted after the 
entry of the interlocutory decree. At the conclusion of the 
new trial it was ordered that the previous interlocutory de-
cree remain in effect, and on the same day, but more than one 
year after the entry of the original interlocutory decree, a 
final decree of divorce was entered. This final decree was re-
versed on appeal, on the anthority of Webster v.Webster, 
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132 states t/Ult "if any appl'al is taken from the interlocutory 
judgment or motion for a new trial made. final judgment shall 
not be entered until such motion or appeal has been finally 
disposed of, nor then, if the motion has been granted or .1ud9-
ment reversed." (Italics added.) In the DeVall case the motion 
for a new trial was granted, .and it was held on appeal, follow-
ing the reasoning of the Webster case. that a final decree of 
divorce could not be entered until one year had elapsed from 
)he time of entry of the judgment on new trial. [n the present 
case the interlocutory decree was reversed on appeal, but the 
majority hold that a final decree of divorce can be entered 
before one year has elapsed from the entry of the judgment 
on retrial. This holding is irreconcilable with that in the 
DeVall case, and is inconsistent with the reasoning of the 
Webster case. 
In my opinion the interpretation given section 132 in the 
Webster case was erroneous. Since section 132 is concerned 
solely with the dissolution of the marital relationship of the 
parties, it should be interpreted to mean that only when an 
appeal is taken from the provisions of the interlocutory de-
cree dissolving the marriage is the entry of a final decree 
of divorce prohibited until that appeal is finally disposed of 
by affirmance or by retrial, or in case of another appeal by 
affirmance thereof. Furthermore, the principal reason given 
for the holding in the W. ebster case is not persuasive. In that 
case it was said" 'that in granting a divorce the court has a 
variety of duties to perform affecting the property rights 
of the parties and the future welfare of those parties and 
their children; and it was deemed advisable [by the Legisla-
ture] that in such cases all of those matters, as far as possible, 
should be finally adjusted in connection with the granting 
of a divorce.''' (Webster v. Webster, 216 Cal. 485, 494 [14 
P.2d 522].) There is no basis for this statement in either the 
statutes or other cases of this court. Neither alimony nor 
custody of children are "finally adjusted" at the time of 
granting a final decree of divorce; both can be modified at 
any time thereafter. (Civ. Code, §§ 138, 139.) Moreover the 
trial court is not required to divide the community prop-
erty or decide the problem of custody at the time of the inter-
locutory decree,but can determine those matters in separate 
actions. (Pereira v. Pereira, 156 Cal. 1, 10 [103 P. 488, 134 
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Cal. ',4 [147 P. 1168]; Elms v. Elms, 4 Ca1.2d 681,685 [52 
P.2d 223. 102 A.L.R. 811].} Even if the Legislature deemed 
it advisable that property rights and custody should be finally 
adjusted in the divorce action, that objective is defeated by 
the Webster rule. If the parties, or the court, foresee long 
litigation over those matters, they may leave them to be de-
termined later or in separate actions to avoid prolonging in-
definitely the dissolution of the marriage. 
The only other reason given in support of the holding in 
the Webster case is that the Legislature favors the prolonga-
tion of the marriage. The Legislature, however, by the ex-
press terms of section 132 fixed the expiration of a one year 
period after the entry of the interlocutory decree as the 
time for the entry of the final decree of divorce in the absence 
of an appeal from the trial court's determination that a 
divorce should be granted. Section 132 also expresses a legis-
lative policy favoring the restoration of the parties to the 
status of single persons and enabling them to remarry after 
the expiration of the one year period. As amply illustrated 
by the present case, the Webster rule permits the frustration 
of these policies by a litigious spouse's repeated appeals from 
~e provisions of the interlocutory decree dividing the com-
munity property. In my opinion the obvious purpose of the 
appeal and new trial provision of section 132 is to prevent 
the dissolution of the marriage until the right thereto is finally 
settled. Once it is finally determined that a divorce is proper 
and the one year period has elapsed, the purpose of section 
132 is fully accomplished. 
The holding in the Webster case is also out of harmony 
with the general rules giving finality to severable parts of 
judgments not appealed from or not subject to a motion for a 
new trial. If a partial appeal is taken from a judgment in 
which the issues determined are severable. the parts not 
appealed from become final and are beyond the scope of 
review of the appellate court. (American Enterprise,' Inc. 
'9. Van Winkle. supra. 39 Cal.2d 210. 216; G. Ganahl Lbr. 00. 
'9. Weinsl1eig, supra, 168 Cal. 664. 667; Whalen v. Smith. 
aupra, 163 Cal. 360. 362.) If the part appealed from is re-
versed. and a new trial is had on the issues involved therein. 
the parts not appealed from are not affected. (Smith v. 
Anglo-Oalifornia Trust 00., 205 Cal. 496. 505 [271 P. 8981 ; 
. Ne·ill v. Five 0 Re/inin.g 00 .• 79 Cal.App.2tl 191. 194 [179 




90 HARROLD t). HARROLD l4a C.2d 
involved in a severable part of a judgment without affecting 
the other parts. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 657, 662.) 
Section 132 should be interpreted in the light of these gen-
eral rules, and they should apply to judgments in divorce 
actions, for there are no persuasive reasons for assuming that 
section 132 establishes an exception to them. The reliance in 
the Webster case on the use of the word .. any" in that sec-
tion is oot persuasive. In the light of the purpose of sec-
tion 132 and the rules governing partial appeals, it means 
.. any" appeal from the part of the interlocutory decree dis-
solving the marriage. Moreover, authority for appeals from 
interlocutory decrees in divorce actions is given in the same 
section of the Code of Civil Procedure that grants authority 
for appeals from judgments generally. (§ 963, subd. 2.) In 
divorce actions, the frequent appeals from the part of the inter-
locutory decree dividing the community property demonstrate 
that it is ordinarily severable from the part decreeing a dis-
solution of the marriage. (E.g., Pereira v. Pereira, supra, 156 
Cal. 1, 10; Elms v. Elms, supra, 4 Ca1.2d 681, 685; Wilson v. 
Wilson, 76 Cal.App.2d 119, 122 [172 P.2d 568J.) As the 
majority opinion concedes, in the present case these issues 
are not so interwoven or interdependent that they cannot be 
considered independently of one another . 
. The Webster case should be overruled and the Newell, 
Cory, Ritter, and DeVall cases disapproved, and it should 
be held that a final decree of divorce can be entered at any 
time after the expiration of one year from the entry of the 
interlocutory decree, when, as here, there is no appeal from ! 
provisions of the interlocutory decree dissolving the marriage 
and the issues involved in an appeal from the provisions of 
the interlocutory decree dividing the property are severable 
from those involved in the dissolution of the marriage. 
Schauer, J., concurred. 
EDMONDS, J.-It may well be better social policy to allow 
the entry of a final decree of divorce when an appeal is pend-
ing from only the provisions of the interlocutory decree deal-
ing with property rights. But the Legislature has stated in 
language too clear to be misunderstood that" if any appeal is 
taken from the interlocutory judgment" the final decree may 
not be entered until the appeal is finally disposed of. (Civ. 
Cr"k ~ 1~2 [emphasis added].) Consistently, the section 
has UL'L'll so construed and applied for over 20 years. 
) 
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(Webster v. Webster, 216 Cal. 485 l14 P.2d !)22J, nlld ea8P.f1 
following that decision.) 
It seems evident that the section is capable of abuse by a 
wife who may prolong the marriage status almost indefinitely 
by a series of appeals, and thus continue to enjoy a share in 
the husband's earnings. Justice Traynor would allow the 
final decree to be entered pending an appeal from the property 
parts of the interlocutory judgment, according to principles 
relating generally to partial appeals. Justice Shenk would 
allow that decree to be entered after an appeal has been taken 
and decided, although the result of the appeal has been to 
remand the cause for further proceedings. Both solutions 
ignore the specific mandate of section 132; both solutions to 
that extent amount to a judicially legislated repeal of the 
section. 
It is fun~amental that the courts should not substitute 
their standards of social policy for those of the Legislature. 
In the present situation, that body has clearly stated that 
there shall be no final decree until the final disposition of 
any appeal from the interlocutory judgment. If the social 
,policy of the state should be to allow the parties to obtain a 
'final judgment of divorce notwithstanding unsettled issues 
as to property rights, the remedy is for the Legislature to 
amend section 132 accordingly. 
I would reverse the judgment insofar as it purports to 
direct the entry of a final judgment of divorce. 
